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Publicly-traded debt securities differ on a number of dimensions, including quality, maturity, seniority,
security, and convertibility.  Finance research has provided a number of theories as to why firms should
issue debt with different features; yet, there is very little empirical work testing these theories.  We
consider a sample of 14,867 debt issues in the U.S. between 1971 and 2004.  Our goal is to test the
implications of these theories, and, more generally, to establish a set of stylized facts regarding the
circumstances under which firms issue different types of debt. 
 
Our results suggest that there are three main types of factors that affect the structure of debt issues:
First, firm-specific factors such as leverage, growth opportunities and cash holdings are related with
the convertibility, maturity and security structure of issued bonds.  Second, economy-wide factors,
in particular the state of the macroeconomy, affect the quality distribution of securities offered; in
particular, during recessions, firms issue fewer poor quality bonds than in good times but similar numbers
of high-quality bonds.  Finally, controlling for firm characteristics and economy-wide factors, project
specific factors appear to influence the types of securities that are issued.  Consistent with commonly
stated 'maturity-matching' arguments, long-term, nonconvertible bonds are more likely to be issued
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Firms face a complex menu of choices when making financing decisions.  Managers must decide 
whether to finance investment projects with retained earnings, outside equity, or one of many possible types of 
debt.   Prior research related to the choice of financing has focused mostly on the broad choice between debt 
and equity in general such as theories based on optimal leverage ratios, asymmetric information, and market 
timing.  However, firms most often use debt rather than equity to finance projects; Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1996) observe that from 1946 to 1987, 85 percent of total U.S. external financing was raised through debt 
offerings, compared to only 7 percent through equity offerings.  Therefore, to understand how firms finance 
investments, the choice between alternative types of debt financing is likely to be equally, or even more 
important than the choice between equity and debt.   
Debt contracts differ on a number of dimensions, including maturity, security, seniority, covenants, and 
different types of embedded options such as convertible features and call options.  These features vary both 
across different firms’ debt issues and over time within the same firm’s issues, even when institutions, 
regulations, taxation, and market conditions remain relatively constant.  While there are many theories 
discussing the possible reasons why firms structure debt in particular ways, there has been surprisingly little 
empirical work testing the implications of these theories.   
This paper attempts to fill this void, by empirically investigating the structure of public debt financing.   
We rely on the Mergent database, which provides detailed information on the bond contracts of 14,867 
publicly-traded U.S. debt issues between 1971 and 2004.  We focus on five specific characteristics of bond 
contracts: convertibility, maturity, security, callability, and credit quality.  In doing so, we have two main goals.  
First, we hope to establish a set of stylized facts on the use of various types of bonds by U.S. corporations over 
time.  Second, we wish to test the predictions of theories that provide explanations for why firms will use 
alternative types of public debt. 
The explanations we focus on for observed differences in debt contracts fall into three categories.   
First, corporate finance theory has argued that certain firm characteristics are likely to affect the structure of 
debt contracts.  In particular, a firm’s size, the nature of its growth options, as well as its cash flows and cash 
holdings are all potential determinants of the type of features included in a bond contract.  In addition, the state 
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of the macroeconomy can also influence the characteristics of observed debt offerings.  Financial constraints 
are likely to be exacerbated during a recession, limiting firms’ ability to issue anything but the highest quality 
debt.  Finally, holding firm characteristics and economic conditions constant, firms also potentially issue 
different types of debt over time as a function of the type of project the debt is used to finance.  Thus, theory 
suggests that the properties of debt issues should be a function of firm-level, economy-level, and project-level 
factors. 
We first summarize the various characteristics of public debt issues, and document how they have 
changed over time.  The overall quantity of public debt issues has increased dramatically in recent years.  The 
$2 trillion issued in the 2000-2004 period represents almost a six-fold increase in total issuance relative to the 
sub-period beginning only ten years earlier, 1990 to 1994.  In addition, recent debt issues have become shorter-
term, more likely to be convertible, and less likely to be callable than they were in the 1971-1984 period.   
The main focus of the paper is on the factors that lead firms to use alternative kinds of debt.  We first 
perform univariate comparisons of the characteristics of firms issuing different kinds of debt.  These 
comparisons are suggestive, but do not control for other factors that are correlated with both the issuance’s type 
and firm-level factors.  We therefore use a multivariate approach to estimate the marginal effect of firm 
characteristics on security choice.  This problem is complicated by the fact that firms can choose when and 
whether to issue a security at all, and by the fact that they can substitute for some security features with other 
characteristics.  Because of these statistical issues, we use a probit model with an explicit correction for 
selection bias.  The results are largely consistent with the univariate specification.  Thus, we are relatively 
confident that our conclusions come from the actual economics of security choice rather than from econometric 
mismeasurement.   
Finally, we consider the possibility that funds raised from different kinds of debt are used for different 
purposes.  To do so, we estimate equations similar to those in Kim and Weisbach (2007), which predict the 
uses of an incremental dollar raised from different sources.  We estimate these equations for different kinds of 
debt, and find that capital from different kinds of debt does in fact get used for different purposes, even when 
we control for other firm characteristics by including firm fixed effects in the equation. 
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Overall, our results suggest a number of factors that affect the structure of debt securities.  Firms 
issuing convertible debt tend to be smaller, and have higher growth opportunities than firms issuing 
nonconvertible debt.  In addition, firms issuing convertible debt are more likely to use the proceeds for R&D 
and less likely to use them for capital expenditures than firms issuing nonconvertible debt.  This pattern is 
consistent with the arguments of Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998), suggesting that convertible debt is somewhat 
‘equity-like’, in that it is preferable for financing projects with embedded real options, particularly in situations 
in which asymmetric information is likely to be severe.  Finally, when we control for firm characteristics, we 
find that convertible bonds are more likely to be issued in a recession than in an economic boom. 
The maturity of the debt issue is also an important consideration in the choice of security.  A 
commonly stated argument by practitioners is that firms should ‘match maturities’ of the security it issues with 
the investment it finances.  Our results do support this finding, in that short-maturity debt is more likely to be 
used to finance R&D, while long-maturity debt is more likely to finance capital expenditures.   In addition, 
consistent with the Diamond (1991) liquidity risk arguments, short-term issuers are more likely to be larger, 
have lower fixed asset ratios, stronger growth opportunities, and hold more cash than otherwise similar issuers 
of long-term debt. 
Another choice firms face when they issue debt is whether the debt should be secured or unsecured.  
Theoretically, it is not clear what kinds of firms we should observe using secured debt.  It is possible that they 
could be high quality firms seeking to avoid investment inefficiencies associated with unsecured debt, as 
argued by Smith and Warner (1979), Stulz and Johnson (1985), and Berkovich and Kim (1990).  Alternatively, 
as emphasized in the banking literature (Berger and Udell (1990)), secured debt could be primarily used by 
low-quality firms who cannot otherwise raise capital without providing security.  Our results are consistent 
with the arguments from the banking literature.  Firms that issue secured debt tend to be much more highly 
levered than firms issuing unsecured debt.  In addition, firms tend to issue secured debt after periods of low 
cash flows and poor stock performance.  
Debt contracts often contain imbedded options, the most common of which are call provisions.   One 
advantage of callability is to provide a natural hedge against interest rate risk, since firms can redeem them at 
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prespecified prices if interest rates fall.  In addition, the corporate finance literature has argued that one 
potential motive for issuing callable debt is to minimize potential underinvestment or overinvestment 
distortions arising from the agency costs of debt.  Our evidence is consistent with the interest rate hedging view, 
as callable bonds are more likely to be issued during periods of high interest rate volatility by firms most likely 
to find hedging motives useful.  In contrast, we do not find support for the agency cost of debt explanations for 
call provisions; firms issuing callable bonds do not appear to have higher growth opportunities than firms 
issuing non-callable bonds.  
We finally consider the bond’s quality, measured by its rating.  Not surprisingly, firms issuing higher-
rated debt tend to be larger, with higher cash flow and market to book, and with lower stock price volatility 
than firms issuing lower quality debt.  Perhaps more surprisingly, firms issuing higher-quality debt hold less 
cash and are more likely to issue in bad economic times compared to firms issuing lower quality debt.  This 
pattern is consistent with the ‘financial constraints’ view, in which potential financial constraints induce firms 
to hold a more liquid balance sheet and lower quality firms are shut out from the capital markets during 
recessions. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section I summarizes some related literature and 
develops the main hypotheses to be tested.  Section II describes the data employed in this paper and reports 
summary statistics.  Section III presents univariate results linking debt characteristics to firm characteristics, 
macroeconomic conditions and different uses of funds.  Section IV presents our multivariate analysis of debt 
structure choice.  Section V examines the determinants of credit quality and section VI reports the effect of 
debt type on post issuance investment expenditures.  Section VII concludes. 
 
I. Hypothesis Development and Related Literature 
The literature related to financing choices is vast.  We focus here on prior research dealing with the 
specifics of debt contract design.  This literature can be classified into two broad groups.  The first strand of 
literature focuses on the demand side as a determinant of debt contract design.  This research has focused 
mainly on firm characteristics, such as size, growth opportunities, degree of asymmetric information, and firm 
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risk as the primary determinants in the choice of financing.  The second and more recent strand of literature 
focuses on the supply of debt financing as a factor in financing choice.  We briefly review here some of the 
relevant literature on debt financing from both the demand and supply sides.  The first three subsections briefly 
summarize literature on how firm characteristics determine the maturity, seniority and exchangeability features 
of debt contracts.  The last subsection discusses some papers on the impact of credit supply and 
macroeconomic conditions on debt financing.  
A.  Maturity Structure 
Myers (1977) originally proposed that risky debt can induce suboptimal investment incentives when a 
firm has valuable growth options.  Managers acting in behalf of shareholders will not exercise valuable growth 
options if the returns to investment accrue primarily to risky debt holders.  Myers argues that one way to avoid 
this underinvestment incentive is to issue short-term debt that matures prior to the exercise of growth options.  
The empirical prediction coming from this argument is that firms with high growth opportunities will tend to 
use shorter-term debt than firm whose value is made up primarily of fixed assets.  
Flannery (1986) argues that the debt maturity choice can signal inside information about firm quality to 
outside investors when insiders are better informed.  In the presence of transaction costs, lower-quality firms 
will tend to avoid short-term debt because they cannot afford the costs of frequently rolling over their debt.  
Diamond (1991) also presents a model of debt maturity based on private information.  In his model, short-term 
debt exposes a firm to liquidity risk and loss of control rents.  The main empirical prediction of Diamond (1991) 
is that borrowers with a low credit rating have no choice but to borrow short-term via private placements and 
banks.  Firms with intermediate credit quality will borrow long-term publicly traded debt because they face 
relatively high liquidity risks.  Firms with high credit quality will be issuers of short-term debt, such as 
commercial paper.  Thus, the theory predicts that firms with very high or very low credit will borrow short term 
(with different contracts), with long-term debt being issued by firms with credit quality somewhere in the 
middle. 
Myers (1977), Diamond (1991) and Hart and Moore (1994) suggest that the maturity of debt will 
match the timing of cash flow from assets.  In the case of Myers (1977), this helps alleviate the 
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underinvestment incentive, while in Diamond (1991) it helps mitigate risk of inefficient liquidation.  The 
matching of debt maturity to that of assets in the Hart and Moore model comes from the threat of the 
entrepreneur to withdraw his human capital from the financed project.  This ‘matching maturity principle’ 
predicts that debt maturity will be directly correlated with asset maturity.  Thus, we expect that investment in 
long-term tangible assets will be financed primarily with long-term debt, while R&D and other short-term 
investments will be financed with short-term debt securities. 
Several papers have studied the relation between debt maturity and firm characteristics empirically.  
Barclay and Smith (1995b) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) find that larger, less risky firms tend to have debt with 
longer maturity.  Using a proxy for asset maturity, they also find that firms with longer asset maturity tend to 
have longer debt maturity, consistent with the notion that firms match the maturities of their assets and 
liabilities.  These papers find mixed support for the hypothesis that debt maturity is inversely related to growth 
opportunities.  Guedes and Opler (1996) find that larger firms with investment grade credit tend to borrow at 
both the long and short term of the maturity spectrum, while risky firms tend to issue debt with more 
intermediate maturities.  This finding is consistent with Diamond’s (1991) prediction that risky firms do not 
issue short term debt because of the risk of inefficient liquidation.   
B.  Seniority/Security Structure 
 
  Debt contracts also differ by levels of seniority or priority. At the bottom of the priority ladder is 
common stock, which as a residual claim is paid only when all other claimants have been paid in full.  Above 
common stock is preferred stock, then subordinated debt, then ordinary debt, and finally secured debt.  
Theoretically, Stulz and Johnson (1985) argued that issuing secured debt allows a firm to undertake some 
projects that would be rejected if financed by equity or other form of debt.  Berkovitch and Kim (1990) show 
that the issuance of secured debt can decrease underinvestment, but increase overinvestment.  Smith and 
Warner (1979) argue that including higher seniority provisions in the debt contract limits the firm’s ability to 
engage in asset substitution.  The empirical prediction of these models is that highly indebted firms with 
relatively good growth options are more likely to have a large proportion of senior claims in their capital 
structures.   
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In contrast, Berger and Udell (1990) argue that firms issue more senior/secured debt in situations in 
which the firm is not doing well and providing seniority is the only way in which they are able to issue the 
securities.  Their argument implies that firms issuing secured debt should be relatively poor performers and 
have low growth options.  Barclay and Smith (1995a) examine this issue empirically and find results largely 
consistent with the agency cost view.    
C.  Exchangeability  
Another dimension upon which debt contracts differ is the degree to which the issue can be exchanged 
or converted for a different security.  These bonds are typically associated with an option given either to the 
issuer or bondholder to exchange the debt for another security.  For example, callable debt gives the issuer the 
option to exchange cash for the outstanding debt at a pre-specified price.  Convertible debt gives the 
bondholder the option to convert a bond into a certain number of common shares at a pre-specified conversion 
ratio.  Putable debt gives the bondholder the option to sell the bond back to the issuer.  The literature has 
argued that these exchangeability features of debt mitigate information asymmetries with convertible debt 
(Stein 1992) and agency costs with callable debt (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980)).  Guntay, Prabhala and 
Unal (2002) suggest that callable debt can be used to hedge against interest rate risk.  In addition, convertibility 
can lead to more efficient investment in situations in which a substantial fraction of a firm’s investment is in 
the form of future investment options (Mayers 1998). 
D.  Macroeconomic Conditions and Financial Constraints 
  Some of the more recent work in capital structure choice has focused on the supply of credit as a 
determinant of firms’ observed capital structures, arguing that frictions in the credit markets limit the ability of 
firms to achieve their desired level of debt, particularly during periods of recession in the economy.  
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that firms which have access to debt markets, proxied by whether a firm 
has a credit rating, have significantly more leverage than firms without credit ratings.
1   Korajczyk and Levy 
                                                 
1 In a related paper, Sufi (2007) finds that the introduction of syndicated bank loan ratings in 1995 leads firms to increase 
their use of syndicated debt, and ultimately increase investment and acquisitions financed with this debt.  Leary (2007) 
studies the emergence of the CD market in 1961 (credit expansion) and the 1966 credit crunch (credit contraction) and 
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(2003) argue that the issuing decision of firms is affected by their access to capital and the state of the economy, 
and find evidence supporting this view. Lamont (1995) suggests another channel through which financial 
constraints can become exacerbated during times of recession.  As the economy moves into a recession, debt 
overhang becomes more binding as growth options tend to diminish and agency costs may hinder access to 
financing for firms with higher probabilities of default. 
  
II.  Data Sources and Sample Description 
A.  Data Sources 
We obtain data on public debt issues in the United States from the 2005 version of the Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database (FISD). This database provides comprehensive information for US corporate debt, 
including characteristics such as seniority, maturity and convertibility as well as total proceeds raised.  
Macroeconomic data are obtained from two sources.  Recession/expansion dates are from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) and GDP growth rates are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
We obtain financial information on the issuing firms by matching each issue with its corresponding 
firm in Compustat based on fiscal year ends and keep only those with accounting information available before 
and after the issue date.  Accounting variables, with the exception of total assets, are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% of the sample distribution for each variable.  Since cash flow statement items are available in Compustat 
only after 1971, we set our sample period to start from then. In addition, we eliminate all debt issues from 
financial firms (SIC 6000-6999).   After applying these filters, we end up with 14,867 debt issues, each 
occurring between 1971 and 2004. 
B. Characteristics of Total Debt Issues over Time 
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our public debt issuance sample.  To provide a rough idea of 
the time-series variation in the design of debt contracts, we divide the sample into five sub-periods.  For each 
                                                                                                                                                                       
finds that the leverage ratios of bank-dependent firms increase following the expansion and decrease following the 
contraction. 
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sub-period, we report the number of issues (Panel A) and value of the proceeds raised (Panel B) for all issued 
bonds, as well as by each type of issue, sorted by convertibility, initial maturity, security, callability, and credit 
rating.  The overall pattern shows an increasing trend in the use of publicly traded bonds over time.  Our 
sample contains 947 total debt issues over the 1971 to 1984 sub-period, compared to 4,498 total issues in the 
much shorter 2000 to 2004 sub-period.  The total proceeds raised over the sample period was $3.66 trillion, 
with just over 80% of that total amount raised since 1995.  Overall, our sample firms raised on average $246 
million per each debt issue throughout the sample period, with a corresponding median value of $125 million.  
As a comparison, the magnitudes of debt issues are somewhat larger than average amount raised through 
seasoned equity offerings.
2   
To verify that the trends reported above are material and not simply reflect the growth in the overall 
economy, we report in panels C and D the number of issues and the total proceeds raised scaled by number of 
firms in Compustat and total liabilities of firms in Compustat, respectively.  The results indicate that the growth 
in public debt market is still pronounced even after controlling for the growth in the overall economy. 
C.  Debt Issues by Type and Quality 
Public debt issues vary along a number of dimensions, including convertibility, maturity, security level, 
callability, and other features.  Table I also summarizes the use of these various features over time.  There has 
been an upward trend in the use of convertible bonds over time, both in terms of the proportion of total bonds 
issued and the proportion of proceeds raised.  Panel A demonstrates that while about 9% of total bonds (5% of 
the proceeds) issued during 1971 to 1984 were convertible, 24% of total bonds (19% of the proceeds) issued 
between 2000 and 2004 were convertible.   A similar trend emerges in the use of short-term debt over time.  If 
we define an issue as short-term when it has an initial maturity of five years or fewer, none of the issues in our 
sample were classified as short-term in the 1971 to 1984 sub-period.  Using this definition, the proportion of 
total issued debt classified as short term increased rapidly, reaching 30% of all issues and 39% of total proceeds 
                                                 
2 The mean and median proceeds raised between 1990 and 2003 through seasoned equity offerings in the US are $100.3 
million and $45.5 million, respectively, according to Thomson Financial’s SDC New Issues database. 
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raised by the 2000 to 2004 sub-period.
3  To ensure that the lack of short-term bonds during the 1971 to 1984 
period is not a data issue, we consult the SDC database and find similar patterns in the issuance of short-term 
debt over the sample period. 
Table I also demonstrates that the vast majority of public debt issues are unsecured.  Secured debt 
makes up only 3% of total issued bonds and 2% of the proceeds in our sample.  These proportions have 
remained relatively stable over time.  In contrast, callable debt is much more common.  However, the incidence 
of callability varies substantially over the sample period.  During the 1971 to 1984 period, 83% of all issued 
bonds were callable.  This figure dropped to 28% of issued bonds during 1990 to 1994.  The most recent sub-
period, 2000 to 2004, has seen a resurgence in the popularity of callable bonds, with these bonds making up 
73% of total issues and 56% of total proceeds raised. 
The last five columns of Table I summarize the number of issues and proceeds raised by bonds of 
various credit quality.
4  We group bonds into five different quality categories: non-rated bonds, C-rated bonds, 
speculative B-rated bonds (Moody’s B3 to Ba1 ratings), investment grade B-rated bonds (Moody’s Baa3 to 
Baa1 ratings), and A-rated bonds.  Compared to the variation of bond types issued over time, the distribution of 
credit quality seems relatively stable over each of the five sub-periods.  There has been a slight upward trend in 
the use of speculative and non-rated bonds over the sample period.  Approximately 40% or all issued bonds and 
29% of total proceeds raised were from speculative and non-rated bonds in the 1971 to 1984 sub-period.  
During 2000 to 2004, these bonds made up 55% of total issued bonds and 40% of total proceeds raised through 
public debt financing.   
Table II provides cross-tabulations of debt issue type for all issues during the sample period to examine 
patterns in the bivariate distribution of debt issues.  The table provides observed two-way frequencies, 
percentages, and the expected frequency of bonds in each category we should observe if the two classifications 
were independent of each other.  Looking first at convertibility and maturity, we see that of the 12,817 straight 
                                                 
3 The typical classification of short-term vs. long-term debt is different for publicly traded bonds.  For bank debt, contracts 
with less than one year to maturity are usually classified as short-term.  For publicly traded debt, the short-term cutoff is 
typically considered to be five years or fewer.   
4 Credit ratings are based on Moody’s.   
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debt issues, 20.7% are short-term and 79.3% are long-term.  Among the convertibles, 18.4% of the bonds are 
classified as short term.  A chi-square test of independence between maturity and convertibility rejects the 
assumption that maturity and convertibility are unrelated.  Specifically, convertible bonds are more likely than 
nonconvertible bonds to have initial maturities of more than five years. 
Convertibility and security level also appear to be correlated, as only four secured bonds in our sample 
are also convertible.  Thus, almost all secured debt issues are straight debt, which seems plausible, since 
holders of secured, convertible debt would lose their security upon conversion.  However, there does not appear 
to be a significant relationship between security level and initial maturity, as the initial maturity of secured 
bonds appears to have a similar distribution to that of unsecured bonds.  In terms of callability, secured bonds 
appear to be more likely to have a callable feature than unsecured bonds.  Slightly more than 80% of the 
secured bonds in our sample are also callable, compared to 57.3% of the unsecured issues. 
One possibly surprising finding is that only 80.8% of convertible bonds in the sample have a callable 
feature.  Convertible bonds are, nonetheless, much more likely to be callable than straight debt issues.  In 
addition, there is a negative relation between initial maturity and callability.  The observed frequency of short-
term, callable bonds is much lower than that expected if the two categories were independent;  820 of the short-
term debt issues are callable, while the expected frequency in this category under independence is 1,750.   
 
III. Univariate Analysis 
A  Firm Characteristics and Debt Structure 
For many reasons, different types of firms tend to issue different types of debt.  Table III provides 
summary statistics for different firm characteristics by type of bond issued to examine how firms differ by size, 
growth opportunities and financial condition at the time of issuance for various types of bonds.   
Since 40% of the firm-fiscal year pairs in the sample have more than one issue during a fiscal year, we 
assign a given firm-year to a certain type of bond as follows:  We define a given firm-fiscal year as convertible 
if there is at least one convertible bond issued during that year.  Out of all firm-years classified as convertibles, 
65% had only one issue during that year and 22% had more than one issue where all of them were 
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convertibles.
5  For maturities, we take the weighted average of the initial maturities of all debt issues during 
that year where the weights are the proceeds raised through each issue.  Firm-years with aggregated maturity of 
less than or equal to 5 years are classified as short term.  For the purposes of defining secured debt, we first 
recode the FISD’s codes into numeric codes as follows: subordinate or no classification as 1, junior subordinate 
as 2, senior subordinate as 3, senior as 4, and senior secured as 5. We take the proceeds-weighted average of 
the security level and define firm-years with aggregate security level of greater than 4 as secured. 
Panel A reports firm characteristics across the various types of debt issues offered in our sample.  The 
first column compares firm-years in which any type of debt was offered to firm-years in which debt was not 
issued for all firms that had at least one public debt issue during the sample period.  Firms tend to be larger, 
have more growth opportunities and better financial performance leading up to the debt issue.  For this sample 
of issuing firms, the average annual stock return for the year just prior to the debt issuance is 26.4%, compared 
to 19.7% for non-issuing firm-years.
6  Stock return volatility is slightly less prior to issuing years and equity 
issuance tends to be lower in years when firms issue debt.  
  The remaining columns in Panel A summarize differences in firm characteristics across different debt 
structures.  Convertible issuers tend to be smaller, high growth firms with lower leverage ratios and lower fixed 
asset ratios compared with straight-debt issuers.  Convertible issuers also tend to issue after periods of high 
stock returns and high return volatility.  They are also likely to issue equity during the same year.  Firms 
issuing short-term debt appear to be systematically different from firms that issue long-term debt.  Short-term 
issuers tend to be larger, have greater growth opportunities, and hold more cash on their balance sheets.  This 
pattern is consistent with Myers (1977) in that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to choose 
short-term debt to avoid potential underinvestment problems.   
                                                 
5 Since the percentage of convertible firm-years that is mixed with straight debt issues is only 13% of the sample, we 
expect the noise from these observations to be minimal. 
6 Prior stock returns in this sample of firms are higher than the long-term average of typical stocks for two reasons.  First, 
Table III summarizes characteristics only for firms that have issued public debt and firms tend to issue after periods of 
good returns.  Second, a large proportion of the debt issues in the sample were issued between the 1996 to 2001 time 
period when the stock market in general had unusually high returns. 
  13  
 
    
Firms issuing secured debt appear to be relatively financially distressed.  These firms are smaller and 
have an average leverage to total capital ratio of 0.81.  They also have relatively weak cash flows leading up to 
issuance compared with non-secured issuers.  These comparisons are consistent with the idea that debt 
investors require more security when lending to financially distressed borrowers.  Callable debt issuers appear 
to be similar to issuers of non-callable debt in general.  Callable issuers are slightly smaller, have higher cash 
balances, and have experienced higher stock returns in the year prior to debt issuance than non-callable issuers.   
  Panel B of Table III reports mean firm characteristics by credit quality of the issued bonds.  We divide 
the bonds into five categories according to their ratings: non-rated, C-rated bonds, speculative B-rated bonds, 
investment grade B-rated bonds, and A-rated bonds.  Some clear patterns emerge from Panel B.  First, there is a 
monotonic relationship between firm size and credit rating.  Highly rated firms tend to be significantly larger 
than firms with high-yield ratings.  They also tend to have more collateral, measured by the ratio of fixed assets 
to total assets.  High-rated issuers have strong cash flows and lower stock return volatility compared to lower 
rated issuers.  A consistent pattern is that firms issuing investment grade bonds have significantly lower cash 
holdings as a proportion of total assets than do the issuers of junk bonds.  While the direct effect of cash 
holdings should be to increase credit quality by enhancing the amount and liquidity of collateral to the 
bondholders, an indirect effect appears to be more important:  More financially constrained firms hold more 
cash to mitigate these constraints, as suggested by Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004, 2007).  These 
constraints also cause firms to have lower bond ratings, leading to a correlation between cash holdings and 
bond ratings. 
B. Macroeconomic Conditions and Debt Structure 
  One of the goals of this paper is to determine whether macroeconomic conditions have any effect on 
the design of public debt issues.  As a first pass at this issue, we consider how the relative share of total debt 
issuance by various bond types changes over the business cycle.  We classify economic conditions in two 
separate ways.  The first is based on annual growth rates in US GDP.  ‘Low Growth’ years are defined as years 
in which the GDP growth rate was less than 2%.  ‘Medium Growth’ years are those with GDP growth between 
2% and 3.5%, while ‘High Growth’ years are those with growth larger than 3.5%.   As a second classification, 
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we rely on the NBER business cycle dating, using the NBER measure of when the economy is in a recession or 
expansion. 
  Table IV reports the proportion of total bond issuance made up of various types of bonds over different 
economic conditions.  Convertible bonds are relatively more likely to be issued during times of slow economic 
growth or recessions.  During high growth periods, 7.7% of total issuances came from convertibles, increasing 
to 11.7% during low growth periods.  A stronger pattern emerges for the issuance of short-term debt:  9% of all 
bonds issued during high growth periods were short term, compared to 22.2% during low growth periods.  
There is a similar pattern if we do the comparison using the NBER-defined recessions as our measure of 
economic activity. 
  The strongest correlations between economic conditions and bond types are found in the variation in 
credit quality across economic conditions.  Investment grade bonds make up 44.1% of all issuance during high-
growth years, increasing to 68.9% of the total during low growth periods.  The results are similar if we look at 
the NBER expansion/recession classifications.  Junk and non-rated bonds account for 51.6% of total debt 
issuance during economic expansions but only 33.7% of total issuance during recessions.  This pattern is 
consistent with the idea that perhaps financial constraints are exacerbated during economic recessions, leaving 
only the highest quality firms with access to public debt markets as suggested by Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
and Lamont (1995).  
Figure 1 illustrates this pattern in debt issuance.  The vertical axis measures the natural logarithm of 
proceeds raised (in $US millions) for each year from 1971 to 2004.  Time periods classified as a recession are 
noted on the chart.  This figure illustrates the overall upward trend in the use of public debt financing in all 
levels of credit quality.  It also points out the differential impact of a recession on different types of issues.  The 
quantity of capital raised by low-rated and non-rated debt issues drops significantly during recession periods, 
while highly-rated bonds remain relatively constant through a recession or even rise in the case of the 1989-
1991 recession.  It also appears that the volatility of proceeds raised over time is higher for lower-rated bonds 
than for highly-rated bonds. 
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C. Univariate Analysis of Post-Issuance Changes in Accounting Variables 
Presumably, there are a number of reasons why firms differ in the type of debt securities they offer.  
We have seen that bond structures are correlated with certain firm characteristics and overall economic 
conditions.  In addition, we consider the hypothesis that the type of debt issued depends on how the funds are 
expected to be used.    Specifically, we conjecture that more equity-like debt such as convertibles and short 
term debt are more likely to be used for intangible investment such as R&D whereas less equity like debt such 
as secured debt are more likely to be used to finance tangible investment such as CAPEX.   
A difficulty in testing whether the expected uses of funds matter for debt design is that we cannot 
directly observe management’s investment plans at the time of issuance.  While firms typically are required to 
disclose the purpose for the debt issue in the prospectus, the description of ‘general purpose’ is most common 
and does not help us identify whether the firm is going to invest in physical assets or R&D.  We proxy for the 
intended uses of funds from a debt issue by estimating the actual uses of the funds raised in the issue during the 
two years following the debt issue.  This approach presumes that the realized post-issuance expenditures reflect 
management’s investment plans prior to issuance.     
To minimize the impact of outliers, we focus on a logarithmic transformation of CAPEX and R&D.  
Since these are flow variables, we consider the log of one plus the accumulation in each variable since the 
issue, normalized by total assets prior to the issue:   ] 1 assets   total ln[( ) 0 1 + ∑ =
t
i i V , where V is the variable 
being measured, and years are normalized so that year 0 is the fiscal year end just prior to the issue and year t 
denotes number of years after year 0.
7  As a consequence of this transformation, the resulting distribution of 
each variable is more symmetric than it is without the transformation.   
Table V reports the means and medians of this normalized increase for capital expenditures and R&D, 
broken down by debt issue type.  Also included are t-statistics for comparisons of means between the various 
types of debt issues in the sample, as well as Mann-Whitney z-statistics for comparing medians.  The first row 
                                                 
7 R&D values are often missing in Compustat.  As is typical in the previous literature, we assume that firms that do not 
report values for R&D actually do small quantities of R&D in their firms, so we replaced missing R&D values with zeros.  
We have repeated the subsequent analysis treating these values as missing, and found very similar results. 
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compares changes in capital expenditures and R&D over the two years after issuance for issuing firm-years 
compared to non-issuing firm years.  Capital expenditures are higher following a debt issue, but expenditures 
on R&D tend to be higher when debt is not issued, suggesting that a substantial quantity of R&D may be 
financed by equity or retained earnings.   
The remainder of Table V compares post-issuance capital expenditures and R&D expenses for 
different types of debt issues.  Consistent with the uses of funds hypothesis, R&D expenditures are significantly 
higher for firms issuing convertibles relative to firms issuing straight debt.  Capital expenditures are higher 
after long-term debt issuance, while R&D expenditures are higher following short-term issues.  Post-issuance 
R&D expenditures for secured debt issuers are significantly lower than those following unsecured issues.  
Capital expenditures are slightly higher following callable issues, but R&D expenses are statistically 
indistinguishable between callable and non-callable debt.  Lower-rated firms tend to have higher levels of 
capital expenditures than highly rated firms.  Finally, post-issuance R&D expenses appear to be similar across 
the credit ratings spectrum with the notable exception of non-rated issues, which have significantly higher post-
issuance R&D than the others.  
 
IV.  Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Accounting Variables across Debt Issue Types  
The univariate results are suggestive of the hypothesis that firm and project characteristics as well as 
macroeconomic conditions help explain the design of debt contracts.  We now utilize a multivariate approach 
that permits us to examine the effect of these potential factors. 
A.  Specification 
We employ multivariate discrete-choice models to estimate the impact of various firm and economic 
characteristics on the choice of securities offered.  The econometric modeling is complicated by the fact that 
when they issue debt, firms are making a number of decisions simultaneously.  First, the firm decides whether 
or not to issue a debt security in a given year.  Then, given the decision to issue a corporate bond, the firm 
decides how to structure the issue in terms of maturity, convertibility, security, and callability.  Because of this 
issue, when we estimate the probability of using a particular type of debt, we explicitly model the probability of 
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issuing that type given that the firm has chosen to issue debt that year.  The general specification for our 
analysis has the form:   
) Economy , stics Characteri   Firm ( ) Issue Debt  | Pr( t it F j Y = =                     (1) 
where j = 0, 1, 2,… indicates the type of debt being issued, F is a cumulative distribution function, 
whose arguments consist of current firm characteristics and economic conditions at the time of issuance.  Firm 
characteristics include firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, fixed asset ratio, cash flow, and cash holdings 
scaled by total assets.  We also control for the net issuance of equity, since other sources of funds may enter the 
firm during the same year as the debt issuance.  Economic conditions are captured by a recession dummy 
variable that takes the value of one during any time period designated by the NBER as being in a recession.  
Year effects are added to control for year-specific characteristics such as the general level of interest rates in 
the economy.  We also include a measure of the slope of the yield curve, measured as the difference between 
the yield on 10-year maturity treasury bonds and the yield on 1-year maturity treasury bonds.   The variability 
in interest rates is measured as the monthly standard deviation of yields on 1-year maturity treasury bonds over 
a given year.  Industry effects are included in most specifications.  All firm variables, except the dummy 
variables, are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.  As such, the estimated marginal effects will 
reflect expected changes in the probability of choosing one type of debt over the other given a one standard 
deviation change in the particular explanatory variable.  The estimates for the recession dummy variable 
represent the change in predicted probabilities if the economy goes from an expansion to a recession.  Only 
firm age, slope of the yield curve, and interest rate volatility remain in their original units. 
We estimate equation (1) using a probit model with an explicit correction for selection.  This method 
assumes that the underlying relation between debt structure and various explanatory variables is: 
j j j x y 1 ε β + = , 
where yj indexes various debt features.  However, yj is only observed if the firm chooses to issue a corporate 
bond.  A selection equation is specified in which the firm first chooses whether or not to issue a corporate bond.  
The selection equation is generally specified such that a firm chooses to issue a bond if 
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, 0 2 > + j j z ε γ  
where  ) , 0 ( ~ 1 σ ε N  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ 2 N ε , with  ρ ε ε = ) , ( 2 1 corr .    The two equations are estimated jointly by 
maximum likelihood.
8  
B.  Convertibility 
The first two columns of Table VI present the estimation results for the choice between convertible and 
straight debt. These results confirm that convertible issuers tend to be smaller firms with relatively low 
leverage ratios.  Convertibles tend to be issued by firms with high market-to-book ratios, consistent with the 
idea that growth firms tend to choose convertible bonds to help avoid potential agency conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders.  These results are also consistent with the predictions of Stein’s (1992) model of 
‘back-door’ equity financing, in which relatively smaller firms issue convertibles to minimize the information-
induced pricing impact from issuing equity. 
Controlling for firm characteristics, high prior stock returns do not significantly increase the probability 
of issuing a convertible bond.  This finding is counter to the common argument that convertible bond issuance 
follows a market-timing pattern similar to that in equity issues.  Unconditionally, firms tend to issue convertible 
debt after periods of high returns.  However, once we condition on the issuance of some kind of public debt 
issue, prior returns do not have significant predictive power in explaining the choice between convertible and 
straight debt in the our sample. 
Conditional on the decision to issue debt, firms are more likely to issue convertible debt during times 
of recession.  The occurrence of a recession increases the predicted probability that a firm will choose a 
convertible issue by almost 17%, controlling for firm characteristics.    
The second column in Table VI presents the marginal effects when we include a measure of the slope 
of the yield curve, as defined by the difference between the yield on 10-year and 1-year treasury securities 
during the year of the issue.  Including this year-specific variable requires us to omit the year fixed-effects that 
                                                 
8 For more details on this estimation procedure, see Greene (2002) pages 930-933.  In an earlier draft, we have also 
estimated equation (1) using a multinomial logit approach, as well as a conditional logit that include firm fixed effects.  
The results using these alternative approaches are similar to those discussed below, and they are available from the authors 
on request. 
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were included in the first specification.  We find some evidence that firms are more likely to issue convertibles 
when the yield curve is upward sloping.  Specifically, an increase of 1% (100 basis points) in the slope of the 
yield curve increases the expected probability of issuing a convertible by 10.4%. 
C.  Maturity 
The third and fourth columns of Table VI report the estimates for the choice between short- and long-
term debt issues.  Consistent with the Diamond (1991) liquidity risk arguments, we find that short-term debt 
issuers tend to be larger, have lower debt levels, stronger growth opportunities, and more cash on the balance 
sheet than firms that choose to issue long-term debt.  The large effect of growth opportunities, as measured by 
the market-to-book ratio, is also consistent with Myers (1977) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980), in which 
firms with better growth opportunities issue on shorter term maturities to help minimize potential agency 
conflicts.   Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the market-to-book ratio increases the predicted 
probability of a short-term issue by 3.1%.  The results are also largely consistent with Flannery (1986) in that 
short-term debt issuers seem to be of better quality than long-term debt issuers.  In terms of economic 
conditions, we find that firms are more likely to issue short-term debt during a recession.  The model predicts 
that a recession increases the probability that a firm issues a short-term bond by 4.9%.  
The fourth column of Table VI reports results that include a measure of the slope of the yield curve 
(and hence necessarily omit the year effects).  These estimates suggest that firms are less likely to issue on the 
short end of the maturity spectrum when the yield curve is upward sloping.  The marginal effect suggests that 
an increase in the slope of 100 basis points decreases the probability that a firm issues a short-term security by 
3.1%.  This finding is counter to the common wisdom that firms adjust the maturity of their bond offering to 
minimize interest payments because of variations in the yield curve.  
D.  Security Level 
The fifth and sixth columns of Table VI report the results of the binary choice models when the firm is 
choosing between secured and unsecured debt.  We find evidence consistent with the ‘banking’ view of secured 
debt (Berger and Udell (1990)), in which poor quality firms have little choice but to issue secured debt as 
investors are more likely to require direct collateral when the firm is nearing bankruptcy.  These results are in 
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contrast with the ‘corporate finance’ view, in which high quality firms issue secured debt to avoid 
underinvestment problems associated with the priority of existing debt claims (Stulz and Johnson (1985), Smith 
and Warner (1979), and Berkovich and Kim (1990)).  In particular, we find that firms issuing secured debt tend 
to be smaller and much more highly levered than unsecured issuers.  Firms also tend to issue secured debt after 
periods of low cash flows and stock returns.  Finally, our results suggest that firms tend to issue secured debt 
when growth options are low.  The estimated parameters imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the 
market-to-book ratio decreases the predicted probability of issuing secured debt over unsecured debt by 2.1%.  
Finally, it does not appear that a recession affects the probability of a firm’s issuing secured debt.   
E. Callability 
The final two columns of Table VI summarize the estimation results for the choice between callable 
and non-callable debt.
 9  The leading explanations for why firms issue callable debt are to mitigate agency costs 
(Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980)) and to hedge against interest rate risk (Guntay, Prabhala and Unal (2002).  
We find no evidence consistent with the view that firms issue callable debt to hedge against underinvestment 
risk, as suggested by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980).  Specifically, firms that issue callable debt do not 
have significantly different market-to-book ratios relative to firms issuing straight debt.   
In contrast, our results are consistent with the view that firms use call provisions to hedge against 
potential interest rate movements.  We find that callable issuers tend to be smaller, lower-levered firms, 
consistent with the arguments of Guntay, Prabhala and Unal (2002), who suggest that it is precisely the smaller 
firms which are most likely to hedge against interest rate risk using call provisions.  In addition, the last column 
of Table VII confirms that firms tend to issue callable debt during periods of high interest rate volatility, again 
consistent with the hedging motive.   
   
V.  Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Credit Quality 
                                                 
9 Because most convertible bonds are also callable, we eliminate these bonds from the sample when we estimate this 
equation.  
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In addition to the features of the bonds, we are also interested in the factors that affect the quality of the 
bond.  Consequently, we estimate equations predicting the bond’s quality, measured by its rating. We estimate 
these equations using a multinomial logit setup, in which the dependent variable has five levels of credit 
quality: non-rated, C-rated, speculative B-rated, investment grade B-rated, and A-rated bonds.  The baseline 
corresponds to the firm choosing not to issue any kind of debt.
10   
  Table VII reports coefficient estimates from equations predicting the credit quality of a firm’s bond 
issue.  Some of the results are not particularly surprising.  For example, larger firms are much more likely to 
issue high-rated debt.  The relation between the effects of size on the probability of issuing high quality debt is 
monotonic across credit rating groups.  In addition, firms with higher growth opportunities and stronger cash 
flows are also more likely to issue investment grade debt.  Finally, lower return volatility increases the 
probability of issuing a highly-rated bond.   
A somewhat counterintuitive finding is that the strong negative relationship between cash holdings and 
the probability of issuing investment grade debt.  This finding is consistent with the logic of Almeida, 
Campello and Weisbach (2004, 2007), who argue that more financially constrained firms are likely to save a 
higher percentage of cash from their cash flows.  Since firms with low bond ratings are more likely to face 
financial constraints, they will tend to save more cash, leading to a negative relation between firms’ cash 
holdings and the ratings of the bonds they issue.   
  The other striking finding from Table VII concerns the impact of recessions on bond ratings.    The 
estimates in this table clearly indicate that a recession increases the quality of bonds that are issued.  Consistent 
with the commonly discussed arguments of practitioners, during bad financial times, poor quality borrowers 
appear to be shut out of the bond market, so that the only bonds that are issued are highly rated.  In other words, 
the fact that the quality of bonds issued is strongly countercyclical is evidence consistent with the view that 
financial constraints are exacerbated during recessions.     
                                                 
10 An alternative specification would be an ordered probit, which would take advantage of the natural ordering of the bond 
ratings.  We do not use this approach because it would not be clear to us where non-rated debt would fall into this 
ordering. 
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There are measurement issues that potentially affect this result.  One is simply the definition of a 
recession.  Therefore, in separate regressions (not reported), we replace the ‘recession dummy’ with GDP 
growth and the number of months in a given year designated as being in a recession.
11  The results are similar 
to the ones reported in Table VII.  Another possibility is that the result is being driven by the decline of the 
bond market in the early 1990s, which coincided with a recession.  To examine this possibility, we reestimate 
this equation excluding the 1989 to 1992 time period; these estimates imply an effect of recessions on security 
issuances essentially the same as those reported in Table VII.  Overall, the result that firms are more likely to 
issue high quality debt during recessions appears to be robust to measurement issues. 
 
VI.  The Effect of Debt Issuance on Post Issuance Investment Expenditures 
  Finally, we examine the extent to which different kinds of bonds are used for different purposes, 
explicitly taking into account the amount of funds raised in the offering.  In particular, a number of theories of 
security issuance relate the type of security issued to the assets that are purchased with its proceeds.  To 
evaluate these theories, we estimate the effect of bond issuances on subsequent potential uses of the capital. 
A.  Estimates of Uses of Funds of Different types of Debt 
We use an approach similar to that used by Kim and Weisbach (2007), who estimate the uses of the 
proceeds from a large sample of equity offerings. This approach allows us to estimate the dollar change in 
various uses of funds given a $1 increase in debt financing.  In particular, we estimate the effect of new funds 
raised by the issuance of a particular type of debt on the measures of increases in CAPEX and R&D discussed 
in Section III.  We also examine the effect on changes in cash holdings.  Since cash is a balance sheet item and 
hence a stock variable, we calculate the log of one plus the change in the variable normalized by total assets 
prior to the debt issue:  () ] 1 ) assets   total ln[( 0 0 + −V Vt .  Specifically, we use the following specification: 
                                                 
11 These estimates are available upon request. 
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i i  
and t = 1 or  4 years after the debt issue.  Total sources of funds include internally generated cash flows from 
the firm’s continuing operations as well as other sources of funds from investment and financing activities.
12  
debt_type_dummy represents dummy for convertibles, dummy for short term bonds, dummy for secured debt, 
or dummy for callable debt depending on the categorization being used.  We then estimate the dollar changes in 
the various uses of funds implied by the regression coefficients for one and four years following the debt issue, 
following Kim and Weisbach (2007).
13
  Table VIII reports estimates of equation (2), omitting β3 through β6 and the year, credit rating, and 
industry fixed effects from the table for the sake of brevity.  Panel A summarizes the results, breaking down 
firms between issuers of convertible bonds to those of straight bonds.  The estimates imply that convertible 
issuers spend much less on capital expenditures than do issuers of straight bonds.  Convertible issuers appear to 
                                                 
12 Specifically, total sources of funds is the sum of funds from operations, sale of property, plant and equipment, long term 
debt issuances, and sale of common and preferred stock.  
13 The calculations are based on a median-sized firm in the sample.  Year, industry, and credit ratings  fixed effects are for 
1998, two digit SIC code 48 (communications), and Aaa rated debt..  For example, the dollar changes in CAPEX for t = 1 
following convertible issue is calculated as follows:  Median debt amount is 200, median total sources are 363.028 and 
median total assets prior to the debt issue are 1,412.532 (All units are in $US million). The estimated coefficients not 
reported in table IX are as follows; β3 = .0804828, β4 =  -.0442473, β5 = .0471107 , β6 = .0013864,  and the constant term 
reflecting 1998 and SIC 48 fixed effects is .0635309. Using these numbers together with coefficients from Table IX yields 
.12880058 as the predicted value of the log transformation, implying a predicted change of 194.17126 in CAPEX.  Then 
we add one to median debt amount (as well as total sources) and repeat the above procedure, which results in a predicted 
change of 194.27808 in CAPEX.  The difference in the two predicted changes represents the dollar changes in CAPEX for 
one unit increase in debt amount, which equals 0.107.  
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spend $0.11 in capital expenditures for each dollar in debt financing in the first year following issuance, and 
$0.20 per dollar after four years, compared to $0.21 after one year and $0.50 after four years for straight debt 
issuers.  In contrast, firms issuing convertible debt tend to allocate more towards R&D financing and cash 
holdings than do straight debt issuers; per dollar raised, convertible issuers spend $.13 per dollar raised in the 
first year and $.50 over the four year period on R&D, compared to less than $.01 for straight debt issuers.  In 
addition, convertible bond issuers save much more of the capital they raise as cash than do straight bond 
issuers; per dollar raised, convertible bond issuers save $.42 in the first year and $.25 over a four year period 
compared to $.20 and $.11 for straight bond issuers. 
  A number of theories of convertible bonds (Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998)) suggest that they will be 
used to finance the same type of investments as equity.  Hence, for comparison purposes, we present in Panel E 
estimates of similar equations for seasoned equity offerings taken from Kim and Weisbach (2007).  The 
estimates for SEOs are very close to those for convertible bonds:  For CAPEX, firms spend $.08 in the first 
year and $.19 over four years out of a dollar raised in an SEO compared to $.11 in the first year and $.20 over 
four years for a dollar raised in a convertible.  For R&D, firms spend $.18 in the first year and $.64 over four 
years out of a dollar raised in an SEO compared to $.13 in the first year and $.50 over four years for a dollar 
raised in a convertible.  Finally, cash holdings increase by $.53 in the first year and $.32 over four years out of 
a dollar raised in an SEO compared to $.42 in the first year and $.25 over four years for a dollar raised in a 
convertible.   It appears from these estimates that firms’ uses of cash raised in convertible bond offerings is 
remarkably similar to the uses of the cash raised in an SEO. 
  Panel B summarizes the estimated uses of fund for issuers of different maturity debt.  We see evidence 
of “maturity matching” (Myers (1977), Diamond (1991) and Hart and Moore (1994)) with long-term issuers 
increasing capital expenditures by $0.19 and $0.47 per dollar of debt raised in one and four years after issuance, 
compared to $0.11 and -$0.13 for short-term issues.  Like convertibles, larger shares of short-term debt 
issuance tend to go to R&D expenditures and increases in cash holdings.   
Panel C reports the results for the secured debt sample.  These results imply that secured debt issuers 
utilize less of the funds they raise in R&D compared to unsecured issuers.   Finally, Panel D summarizes the 
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implied dollar changes in uses of funds following the issuance of callable debt.  Callable debt issues are more 
likely to finance CAPEX over a longer period, but more likely to be held as cash over a shorter period.  
  Overall, the results suggest that firms do use different kinds of securities for different purposes.  
Convertible bonds are more ‘equity-like’, and consistent with the arguments of Mayers (1998) and Stein (1992), 
issuers of convertible bonds are more likely make similar types of investments as issuers of equity.  In contrast, 
issuers of straight debt are more likely to make capital expenditures.  In addition, there appears to be evidence 
of ‘maturity matching’; issuers of long-term debt are more likely to make capital expenditures while shorter-
term debt issuers are more likely to increase R&D.   
B.  Within Firm vs. Across Firm Interpretations 
  An interesting issue is the extent to which these findings reflect differences in the firms issuing the 
securities, or whether they reflect the particular projects undertaken by these firms.  This issue is important, 
because different kinds of firms tend to issue different kinds of debt, and also are likely to make different kinds 
of investments.  To evaluate this possibility, we reestimate Equation (2) with the addition of firm fixed effects.  
The fixed firm effects dramatically reduce the power of our tests, since they require us to utilize only firms that 
make more than one debt issue in our sample period, but, at least to the extent that firm characteristics are 
constant over time, do control for these characteristics.  Results that hold both with and without firm effects are 
likely attributable to particular projects financed by the debt issue in question, while results that hold without 
firm effects but go away when fixed effects are added likely occur because of firm-specific factors that do not 
vary with particular investments. 
  We estimate the following model: 
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Table IX contains estimates of this equation.
14  The results comparing convertible vs. straight 
(nonconvertible) bonds again suggest that convertible bonds are more likely to be used to finance R&D and be 
held in cash, while straight bonds are more likely to be used to finance capital expenditures (at least when 
measured over the four-year window).  These results suggest that firms finance particular projects according to 
their characteristics, with R&D more likely to be financed with convertibles and capital expenditures with 
straight debt. 
The results on maturity are slightly ambiguous.  Although they are not statistically significant, the point 
estimates indicate that long-term debt is more likely to be used to finance capital expenditures.  Short-term 
debts are more likely to finance R&D over one-year period, but are not statistically different over four-year 
period.  It seems likely that the effect of maturity structure on investments is partly driven by differences across 
firms, and partly by differences in particular projects within firms.   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Debt securities vary in many ways, including maturity, seniority, convertibility, callability, as well as 
the overall quality of the issue.  There has been much theoretical work proposing reasons for the choice among 
characteristics of debt securities.  Yet, there has been little empirical work studying the extent to which these 
theories reflect real-world issuance decisions. 
This paper uses a large sample of U.S. public debt issues and examines the factors that lead firms to 
issue different kinds of debt.  It has two main goals. First, it establishes a set of stylized facts about the use of 
various types of debt securities, how debt provisions are used with one another, and how these practices have 
changed over time.  Second, it considers the question of why firms use different kinds of debt.  We propose that 
there are three types of factors that potentially affect the choice of debt securities; firm characteristics, 
economic conditions, and the characteristics of planned investment projects.   
                                                 
14 In this specification, we have replaced industry and credit ratings fixed effects with the firm fixed effect and non-binary 
credit ratings. We assign a value of zero for non-rated debt, one for C rated debt, two for Ca rated debt, and so on.  The 
highest rated debt, Aaa, corresponds to 21. 
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We find that all three types of factors affect the structure of debt securities.  We have a number of 
empirical results, which are summarized in Table X.  This Table indicates that small, growth-oriented firms 
with large R&D expenditures are more likely to issue convertible or short-term debt, while large, established 
firms with large investment in fixed assets are more likely to issue long-term, straight debt.  In addition, 
recessions appear to exacerbate financial constraints in that controlling for other determinants of credit quality, 
firms are more likely to issue highly-rated debt during a recession.    
A novel contribution of this paper is to relate post-issuance expenditures on various uses of funds to 
test theories suggesting that the characteristics of the firm’s marginal investment opportunities have 
implications for the type of debt the firm will choose to issue.  When a firm acquires fixed assets with steady 
expected cash flow streams, firms will have a tendency to issue relatively long-term, senior debt.  When 
intangible assets are acquired, especially those with option-like payoffs, the firm is more likely to issue 
relatively short-term convertible debt securities.   
  Most theories of security design relate the security’s characteristics to the nature of the projects that 
they finance.  Yet, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to link empirically variation in debt financing with 
various types of investment spending.  Clearly, there is much more work to be done.  For example, a large 
fraction of investments are financed through bank or other private debt, but our sample only considers public 
debt issues.  Future research empirically linking other types of financing choices to the uses of the funds raised 
is likely to be fruitful. 
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Table I 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample includes all public debt issued in US by non-financial firms between 1971 and 2004.  We divide the sample into 5 sub-periods.  The first row in each 
sub-period presents the means and the second row provides the relative proportions in each category for each sub period.  Debt with an initial maturity of five 
years or fewer are defined as short term.  Panel A reports the number of debt issues by type, Panel B reports total dollar amounts raised in $US billions, Panel C 
reports number of issues scaled by average number of firms in Compustat, and Panel D reports total proceeds scaled by total liabilities in Compustat. 
  
sub period Total
Number No Yes Long Short No Yes Yes No Non Rated C to Caa1  B3 to Ba1 Baa1 A3 to Aaa
1971-84 947             864           83             947           0 909           38             789 158 171                48                  157                120                451               
(91) (9) (100) 0 (96) (4) (83) (17) (18) (5) (17) (13) (48)
1985-89 1,570          1,317        253           1,438        132           1,530        40             1,121 499 286                144                385                311                444               
(84) (16) (92) (8) (97) (3) (71) (29) (18) (9) (25) (20) (28)
1990-94 3,041          2,820        221           2,563        478           2,972        69             846 2,195 400                123                679                698                1,141            
(93) (7) (84) (16) (98) (2) (28) (72) (13) (4) (22) (23) (38)
1995-99 4,811          4,417        394           3,736        1,075        4,699        112           2,578 2,233 945                274                1,205             985                1,402            
(92) (8) (78) (22) (98) (2) (54) (46) (20) (6) (25) (20) (29)
2000-04 4,498          3,403        1,095        3,156        1,342        4,353        145           3,268 1,233 968                163                1,302             867                1,198            
(76) (24) (70) (30) (97) (3) (73) (27) (22) (4) (29) (19) (27)
Total 14,867        12,821      2,046        11,840      3,027        14,463      404           8,602        6,318        2,770             752                3,728             2,981             4,636            
(86) (14) (80) (20) (97) (3) (60) (40) (19) (5) (25) (20) (31)
sub period Total
Amount No Yes Long Short No Yes Yes No Non Rated C to Caa1  B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa
1971-84 97.9 92.8 5.0 97.9 0.0 95.1 2.8 91.0 6.9 10.5 3.6 13.3 15.2 55.3
(95) (5) (100) 0 (97) (3) (93) (7) (11) (4) (14) (16) (56)
1985-89 230.1 200.7 29.5 210.3 19.8 226.3 3.8 165.9 64.2 30.8 15.6 65.1 51.2 67.4
(87) (13) (91) (9) (98) (2) (72) (28) (13) (7) (28) (22) (29)
1990-94 344.9 296.5 48.4 295.6 49.3 334.3 10.6 135.8 209.0 50.0 11.7 84.3 82.9 116.0
(86) (14) (86) (14) (97) (3) (39) (61) (14) (3) (24) (24) (34)
1995-99 985.9 891.5 94.4 784.9 201.0 961.0 24.9 594.4 391.5 246.9 63.8 257.4 208.7 209.2
(90) (10) (80) (20) (97) (3) (60) (40) (25) (6) (26) (21) (21)
2000-04 2,002.7 1,627.5 375.2 1,223.4 779.3 1,971.6 31.1 1,127.5 871.4 362.5 41.0 399.6 397.4 802.1
(81) (19) (61) (39) (98) (2) (56) (44) (18) (2) (20) (20) (40)
Total 3,661.4 3,109.0 552.4 2,612.0 1,049.4 3,588.3 73.1 2,114.6 1,543.0 700.6 135.6 819.7 755.5 1,250.1
(85) (15) (71) (29) (98) (2) (58) (42) (19) (4) (22) (21) (34)
Panel B: Total Proceeds by Type($US bil.)
Convertible Maturity Secured Quality Callable
Panel A: Number of Debt Issues by Type
Convertible Maturity Secured Quality Callable
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Table I, continued 
 
sub period Scaled
Figures Non convertibles Convertibles Long Term Short Term Unsecured Secured Yes No Non Rated C to Caa1 B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa
1971-74 0.021 0.020 0.002 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.012
(93) (7) (100) 0 (99) (1) (93) (7) (11) (4) (15) (15) (54)
1975-79 0.041 0.040 0.001 0.041 0.000 0.037 0.004 0.038 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.021
(98) (2) (100) 0 (91) (9) (92) (8) (17) (5) (13) (13) (52)
1980-84 0.091 0.081 0.011 0.091 0.000 0.089 0.002 0.071 0.020 0.018 0.005 0.017 0.011 0.041
(88) (12) (100) 0 (97) (3) (78) (22) (20) (5) (18) (12) (45)
1985-89 0.207 0.174 0.033 0.190 0.017 0.202 0.005 0.148 0.059 0.038 0.019 0.051 0.041 0.059
(84) (16) (92) (8) (97) (3) (71) (29) (18) (9) (25) (20) (28)
1990-94 0.362 0.335 0.026 0.305 0.057 0.353 0.008 0.101 0.261 0.048 0.015 0.081 0.083 0.136
(93) (7) (84) (16) (98) (2) (28) (72) (13) (4) (22) (23) (38)
1995-99 0.455 0.418 0.037 0.353 0.102 0.445 0.011 0.244 0.211 0.089 0.026 0.114 0.093 0.133
(92) (8) (78) (22) (98) (2) (54) (46) (20) (6) (25) (20) (29)
2000-04 0.489 0.370 0.119 0.343 0.146 0.474 0.016 0.356 0.133 0.105 0.018 0.142 0.094 0.130
(76) (24) (70) (30) (97) (3) (73) (27) (22) (4) (29) (19) (27)
Total 1.939 1.672 0.267 1.544 0.395 1.886 0.053 1.123 0.817 0.361 0.098 0.486 0.389 0.605
(86) (14) (80) (20) (97) (3) (58) (42) (19) (5) (25) (20) (31)
1971-74 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
(96) (4) (100) 0 (99) (1) (97) (3) (5) (3) (11) (10) (71)
1975-79 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.007
(99) (1) (100) 0 (96) (4) (97) (3) (8) (3) (8) (13) (67)
1980-84 0.014 0.013 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007
(93) (7) (100) 0 (97) (3) (91) (9) (13) (4) (16) (17) (50)
1985-89 0.028 0.024 0.004 0.026 0.002 0.027 0.000 0.020 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.008
(87) (13) (91) (9) (98) (2) (72) (28) (13) (7) (28) (22) (29)
1990-94 0.026 0.022 0.004 0.022 0.004 0.025 0.001 0.010 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.009
(86) (14) (86) (14) (97) (3) (39) (61) (14) (3) (24) (24) (34)
1995-99 0.038 0.035 0.004 0.030 0.008 0.037 0.001 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.008
(90) (10) (80) (20) (97) (3) (60) (40) (25) (6) (26) (21) (21)
2000-04 0.045 0.037 0.008 0.028 0.018 0.045 0.001 0.026 0.020 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.018
(81) (19) (61) (39) (98) (2) (56) (44) (18) (2) (20) (20) (40)
Total 0.249 0.211 0.038 0.178 0.071 0.244 0.005 0.144 0.105 0.048 0.009 0.056 0.051 0.085
(85) (15) (71) (29) (98) (2) (58) (42) (19) (4) (22) (21) (34)
Panel D: Total Proceeds by Type (Scaled by Total Liabilities of Firms in Compustat, averages of annual numbers within each subperiod)
Panel C: Number of Debt Issues by Type (Scaled by Number of Firms in Compustat, averages of annual numbers within each subperiod)
Convertibility Maturity Security Quality Callable
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Table II 
Cross-Tabulation of Debt Issues – 1971 to 2004 
 
This table reports two-way classification tables of US public debt issues by type over the 1971 to 2004 period.  Each cross-tabulation contains three statistics; 
first, the number of bonds falling within each two-way category.  Second, we report the percentage of bonds having a particular column characteristic relative to 
the row total.  For example, 20.7% in the ‘short-term’ column and ‘straight’ row means that 20.7% of straight bonds are short-term.  Third, we report the number 
of bonds in each category we would expect to observe if the two characteristics were independent.  Finally, we include p-values from chi-square tests of 
independence.  
 
Short-Term Long-Term Secured Unsecured Callable Noncallable Row Total
Straight Frequency 2,649 10,168 399 12,418 6,951 5,866 12,817
Percent 20.7% 79.3% 3.1% 96.9% 54.2% 45.8%
Expected Frequency 2,608.25 10,208.75 347.59 12,469.41 7,419.37 5,397.63
Convertible Frequency 375 1,668 4 2,039 1,651 392 2,043
Percent 18.4% 81.6% 0.2% 99.8% 80.8% 19.2%
Expected Frequency 415.75 1,627.25 55.41 1,987.59 1,182.63 860.37
p-value 0.016 0.000 0.000
Short-Term Frequency 83 2,941 820 2,204 3,024
Percent 2.7% 97.3% 27.1% 72.9%
Expected Frequency 82.01 2,941.99 1,750.50 1,273.50
Long-Term Frequency 320 11,516 7,782 4,054 11,836
Percent 2.7% 97.3% 65.7% 34.3%
Expected Frequency 320.99 11,515.00 6,851.50 4,984.50
p-value 0.901 0.000
Secured Frequency 324 79 403
Percent 80.4% 19.6%
Expected Frequency 233.28 169.72
Unsecured Frequency 8,278 6,179 14,457
Percent 57.3% 42.7%
Expected Frequency 8,368.72 6,088.28
p-value 0.000
Column Total 3,024 11,836 403 14,457 8,602 6258.000  
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Table III 
Firm Characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics of firm characteristics for firm-years in which various types of bonds were issued in US over the period 1971 to 2004.  The 






Years Diff. Yes No Diff. Short Long Diff. Yes No Diff. Yes No Diff.
N 6,828 34,755 1,577 5,251 753 6,075 264 6,564 5,070 1,758
ln[Total Assets]: $US mil 7.074 5.888 1.186 6.048 7.382 -1.334 7.368 7.038 0.331 6.271 7.106 -0.835 6.842 7.744 -0.903
Leverage 0.634 0.608 0.026 0.546 0.661 -0.115 0.630 0.635 -0.005 0.810 0.627 0.183 0.630 0.645 -0.015
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.401 0.362 0.038 0.296 0.433 -0.137 0.333 0.409 -0.076 0.512 0.396 0.116 0.394 0.420 -0.025
Market-to-Book 2.800 2.268 0.532 3.370 2.615 0.755 3.718 2.684 1.033 2.249 2.816 -0.567 2.809 2.773 0.036
Cash 0.092 0.109 -0.018 0.192 0.061 0.131 0.136 0.086 0.050 0.083 0.092 -0.009 0.097 0.075 0.022
Cash Flow 0.070 0.064 0.006 0.031 0.082 -0.051 0.041 0.074 -0.032 0.006 0.073 -0.067 0.067 0.081 -0.014
Prior 12-Month Stock Return 0.264 0.197 0.067 0.443 0.205 0.238 0.206 0.271 -0.065 0.071 0.269 -0.198 0.287 0.199 0.087
Return Volatility 0.421 0.441 -0.021 0.569 0.372 0.197 0.506 0.410 0.096 0.612 0.416 0.196 0.443 0.359 0.083













Net Equity Issuance 1,437 671 2,042 1,224 1,454 2,678 2,707
ln[Total Assets]: $US mil 5.636 6.216 6.789 8.069 8.455 8.278 6.647 1.631
Leverage 0.584 0.709 0.679 0.633 0.586 0.607 0.687 -0.079
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.311 0.397 0.399 0.435 0.465 0.451 0.399 0.052
Market-to-Book 3.102 2.510 2.298 2.794 3.342 3.078 2.348 0.730
Cash 0.196 0.098 0.069 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.076 -0.024
Cash Flow 0.013 0.031 0.072 0.100 0.118 0.109 0.062 0.048
Prior 12-Month Stock Return 0.361 0.390 0.287 0.184 0.160 0.172 0.311 -0.139
Return Volatility 0.584 0.533 0.444 0.325 0.274 0.299 0.465 -0.166
Net Equity Issuance 0.066 0.046 0.019 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 0.026 -0.032
*Differences shown in bold face type are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics by Issue Type
Panel B: Firm Characteristics by Issue Credit Quality
All Debt Issues Callable Secured Maturity Convertible
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Table IV 
Macroeconomic Conditions and Debt Design 
This table summarizes the proportion of total debt proceeds by bond characteristics over various states of the 
economy.  High GDP growth is defined as years in which GDP growth exceeded 3.5%.  Medium growth is defined 
as years in which the GDP growth rate was between 2% and 3.5%.  Low growth is defined as years in which the 
annual rate of GDP growth was less than 2%. Time periods are classified as being in either an expansion or a 




GDP Growth High Growth Medium Growth Low Growth Expansion Recession
Issue Characteristics
Convertibility
Straight 0.923 0.888 0.883 0.887 0.871
Convertible 0.077 0.112 0.117 0.116 0.129
Security Level
Secured 0.030 0.046 0.037 0.038 0.012
Unsecured 0.970 0.954 0.963 0.962 0.988
Maturity
Less than 5 Years 0.090 0.119 0.222 0.191 0.311
More than 5 Years 0.910 0.881 0.778 0.809 0.689
Callability
Callable 0.628 0.534 0.609 0.574 0.623
Noncallable 0.372 0.466 0.391 0.426 0.377
Credit Quality
Investment Grade 0.441 0.511 0.689 0.481 0.662
Junk 0.352 0.330 0.189 0.327 0.236
Not Rated 0.194 0.147 0.116 0.189 0.101
Proportion of Proportion of
Total Proceeds Raised Total Proceeds Raised
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Table V 
Project Characteristics and Types of Debt Issues 
This table presents summary statistics for post-issuance capital expenditures and R&D expenditures by issue type.  The expenditure variables are calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the sum of the respective expenditure over the two years following the debt issuance, scaled by total assets.   Test statistics for testing 
differences in the mean and median expenditure amounts across bond types are included.  Differences shown in bold face type are significantly different from zero 
at the 95% confidence level.  The sample period is from 1971 to 2004. 
 
N mean median N mean median
Non Issuing Firm-Years 32,316 0.19 0.13 17,074 0.12 0.05
Debt Issuing Firm-Years 6,150 0.20 0.14 3,186 0.09 0.04
testting the difference t-stat/z-stat 4.09 5.55 -7.86 -7.04
Straight 4,839 0.20 0.14 2,382 0.05 0.03
Convertibles 1,311 0.22 0.14 804 0.18 0.11
testing the difference t-stat/z-stat 2.78 0.31 25.01 15.81
Long Term 5,501 0.21 0.14 2,788 0.08 0.04
Short Term 649 0.15 0.11 398 0.13 0.06
testing the difference t-stat/z-stat -5.27 -7.69 7.03 6.78
Unsecured 5,911 0.20 0.14 3,083 0.09 0.04
Secured 239 0.23 0.14 103 0.04 0.01
testing the difference t-stat/z-stat 1.76 -1.02 -3.61 -5.44
Noncallable 1,623 0.17 0.14 881 0.08 0.04
Callable 4,528 0.21 0.14 2,305 0.09 0.04
testing the difference t-stat/z-stat 5.72 2.31 1.49 -1.88
Non Rated 1,240 0.22 0.13 692 0.17 0.08
C's(C to Caa1) 608 0.27 0.15 232 0.06 0.01
Speculative B's (B3 to Ba1) 1,807 0.20 0.13 853 0.05 0.02
Investable B's (Baa3 to Baa1) 1,125 0.17 0.13 547 0.06 0.04
A's (A3 to Aaa) 1,370 0.18 0.16 862 0.07 0.05
C's vs. Speculative B's t-stat/z-stat -4.75 -4.93 -0.82 2.44
Speculative B's vs. Investable B's t-stat/z-stat -3.61 0.62 0.02 4.74
Investable B's vs. A's t-stat/z-stat 2.31 6.04 4.01 4.89
ln[(CAP EX over next 2 years / 
Total Assets)+1]
ln[(R & D over next 2 years / 
Total Assets)+1]
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Table VI 
Multivariate Analysis: Probit Model with Selection 
This table reports coefficient estimates and marginal effects for two-stage probit models with selection.  In the first stage, the probability of issuing any type of 
corporate bond is modeled as a function of firm size, leverage, fixed asset ratio, market-to-book, operating income, a dummy indicating whether the firm has a debt 
rating, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm’s Altman Z-score is below the sample median and year dummies.  This table reports estimates from the 
second-stage debt design probit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the debt is convertible, short term, secured, or callable, respectively.  t-
statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The sample period is from 1971 to 2004. 
dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX dF/dX
Firm Age 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.10) (1.26) (0.66) (1.04) (-0.56) (-0.77) (-4.35) (-4.71)
ln[Total Assets] -0.032 -0.150 0.090 0.092 -0.040 -0.014 -0.063 -0.015
(-4.31) (-8.28) (4.89 (5.53) (-3.60) (-2.86) (-9.73) (-3.29)
Leverage -0.020 -0.057 -0.022 -0.027 0.033 0.034 -0.002 0.001
(-5.32) (-5.53) (-2.44) (-3.12) (5.51) (5.64) (-0.66) (0.23)
Fixed Asset Ratio -0.013 -0.051 -0.029 -0.032 0.020 0.010 0.005 0.023
(-4.13) (-6.25) (-3.76) (-4.94) (3.62) (4.32) (1.45) (5.59)
Market-to-Book 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.025 -0.021 -0.019 -0.001 0.002
(2.24) (2.79) (3.77) (4.48) (-2.26) (-2.21) (-0.55) (0.75)
Cash Flow 0.478 1.337 -0.121 -0.124 -0.018 -0.017 -0.815 -0.720
(2.45) (2.40) (-0.12) (-0.41) (-4.41) (-4.52) (-2.83) (-3.16)
Cash 0.029 0.085 0.033 0.028 -0.001 -0.001 -0.010 -0.020
(7.58) (8.61) (2.61) (3.96) (-0.19) (-0.33) (-1.99) (-2.10)
Stock Return 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.021 -0.009 0.000 0.001
(1.54) (0.61) (-1.59) (-1.80) (-4.25) (-4.30) (0.02) (0.14)
Return Volatility 0.022 0.094 0.072 0.059 0.025 0.011 0.011 0.020
(6.12) (10.06) (6.91) (8.44) (4.93) (4.99) (1.73) (3.11)
Net Equity Issuance 0.151 0.199 0.009 0.016 -0.023 -0.004 0.337 0.321
(1.40) (0.63) (0.05) (0.13) (-0.19) (-0.09) (0.95) (0.80)
ln[Offer Size] 0.008 0.050 -0.045 -0.065 0.010 0.005 0.040 0.058
(2.5) (5.75) (-6.46) (-10.13) (1.71) (1.84) (12.37) (12.71)
Recession Dummy 0.169 0.187 0.049 0.044 -0.006 0.004 -0.058 -0.030
(6.04) (7.12) (2.13) (2.47) (-0.45) (0.56) (-5.77) (-4.89)
Yield Curve Slope 0.104 -0.031 0.002 -0.007
(11.56) (-4.71) (0.96) (-1.73)
Interest Rate Volatility 0.009 -0.072 0.000 0.056
(0.47) (2.80) (0.00) (2.61)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238 36,238 35,069 35,069
Convertible vs. Straight Short-Term vs. Long-Term Secured vs. Unsecured Callable vs. Noncallable
 








This table reports estimated coefficients from a multinomial logit regression.  The dependent variable has five categories, non rated, C-rated bonds, speculative B-
rated bonds, investment grade B-rated bonds, and A-rated bonds where the baseline case is no debt issues.  t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses.  The sample period is from 1971 to 2004. 
 
 
Explanatory Variables Not Rated C to Caa1 B3 to Ba1 Baa3 to Baa1 A3 to Aaa Investment Grade
vs. Junk Bonds
Firm Age -0.027 -0.019 -0.016 0.006 0.022 0.090
(-6.43) (-6.98) (-7.14) (1.80) (5.01) (11.72)
ln[Total Assets] 0.192 -0.129 0.409 1.147 1.639 2.314
(2.87) (-2.80) (11.53) (26.26) (33.65) (20.90)
Leverage 0.300 -0.106 0.122 0.012 -0.596 -0.899
(6.10) (-2.40) (3.69) (0.21) (-7.35) (-6.97)
Market-to-Book 0.002 0.022 -0.048 0.028 0.344 0.394
(0.05) (0.78) (-1.57) (0.65) (8.24) (4.50)
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.233 -0.010 0.135 0.156 0.008 -0.194
(4.54) (-0.28) (4.53) (3.84) (0.18) (-2.10)
Cash Flow -0.503 -1.983 0.673 31.416 40.706 73.93
(-0.24) (-1.50) (0.13) (5.99) (5.13) (5.86)
Cash -0.116 0.142 -0.343 -0.619 -0.885 -1.189
(-1.91) (4.60) (-7.38) (-6.59) (-8.13) (-6.96)
Net Equity Issuance 3.083 2.304 2.891 -8.666 -8.942 -25.887
(3.08) (2.68) (3.20) (-1.06) (-0.92) (-1.91)
Stock Return 0.115 0.064 0.146 0.051 -0.018 -0.292
(3.96) (2.55) (6.03) (1.00) (-0.28) (-2.93)
Return Volatility 0.109 0.095 -0.041 -0.277 -0.524 -0.965
(3.05) (3.72) (-1.27) (-4.55) (-6.49) (-8.12)
Recession Dummy -0.554 -0.537 -0.122 0.353 0.443 2.011
(-2.88) (-5.19) (-1.50) (3.84) (5.37) (7.59)
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 29,572
Pseudo R-Squared 0.149     
Table VIII 
The Effects of Debt Issuance on Subsequent Increases in Assets and Expenditures 
The dependent variable for CAPEX and R&D is Y =  ] 1 ln[( ) 0 A
1 + ∑ =
t
i i V and for cash holdings is Y = 
() ] 1 ) ln[( 0 0 + − A V Vt .  Independent variables are new debt raised, other sources of funds - both of which are 
normalized by total assets and interacted with debt type dummy – and ln[total assets].  All regressions include year, 
credit ratings, and industry fixed effects.  Dollar changes are the implied change in the dependent variable when 
each debt type is increased by one dollar. Debt type dummy reflects convertibles, short-term, secure, and callable 
debt in panels A through D, respectively.  Panel E is taken from Kim and Weisbach (2007).  Bold letters indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% level, using robust standard errors. The sample period is from 1971 to 2004.  
Dependent Variable:
 ln[((Vt-V0)/Asset)+1] t=1,4 N R-Squared
 ln[(∑Vt/Asset)+1]
Coef t stat Coef t stat Straight Convertible
∑CAPEX 1year 3,602    0.217 4.11 -0.110 -2.21 0.21 0.11 0.38
4years 1,614    0.444 5.44 -0.290 -2.78 0.50 0.20 0.59
∑R & D 1year 3,645    0.002 0.49 0.141 7.57 0.00 0.13 0.47
4years 1,648    0.003 0.23 0.564 6.98 0.00 0.50 0.55
∆Cash 1year 3,144    0.241 4.45 0.283 3.76 0.20 0.42 0.38
4years 1,361    0.121 1.69 0.174 1.77 0.11 0.25 0.37
Coef t stat Coef t stat Long-Term Short-Term
∑CAPEX 1year 3,596    0.193 4.34 -0.086 -2.09 0.19 0.11 0.37
4years 1,613    0.404 5.35 -0.512 -3.69 0.47 -0.13 0.59
∑R & D 1year 3,639    0.030 4.42 0.141 4.75 0.03 0.15 0.43
4years 1,647    0.143 2.80 0.354 3.34 0.13 0.46 0.43
∆Cash 1year 3,138    0.289 6.21 0.286 3.06 0.24 0.45 0.37
4years 1,360    0.138 2.10 0.239 2.46 0.12 0.32 0.32
Coef t stat Coef t stat Unsecured Secured
∑CAPEX 1year 3,602    0.182 4.42 -0.009 -0.12 0.18 0.17 0.37
4years 1,614    0.362 4.55 0.048 0.55 0.42 0.50 0.58
∑R & D 1year 3,645    0.048 4.52 -0.011 -0.62 0.04 0.03 0.37
4years 1,648    0.173 3.30 -0.121 -2.26 0.16 0.05 0.42
∆Cash 1year 3,144    0.343 7.09 -0.128 -2.99 0.28 0.17 0.33
4years 1,361    0.146 2.31 0.229 2.24 0.13 0.33 0.32
Coef t stat Coef t stat Non-Callable Callable
∑CAPEX 1year 2,256    0.183 2.38 0.047 0.56 0.18 0.23 0.40
4years 1,104    -0.167 -0.87 0.690 3.40 -0.18 0.58 0.61
∑R & D 1year 2,285    0.008 1.37 -0.001 -0.22 0.01 0.01 0.31
4years 1,131    0.039 1.01 -0.043 -1.13 0.03 0.00 0.51
∆Cash 1year 1,918    0.101 2.26 0.139 2.17 0.09 0.21 0.29
4years 909       -0.016 -0.25 0.144 1.41 -0.01 0.11 0.25
 ln[((Vt-V0)/Asset)+1] t=1,4 N Fresh Other  R-Squared
 ln[(∑Vt/Asset)+1] Coef t stat Coef t stat Equity Sources
∑CAPEX 1year 6,890    0.081 3.88 0.108 3.88 0.08 0.09 0.20
4years 3,539    0.136 4.18 0.370 6.99 0.19 0.18 0.54
∑R & D 1year 3,669    0.192 4.98 -0.019 -1.28 0.18 -0.01 0.35
4years 1,739    0.523 5.63 0.094 2.98 0.64 0.04 0.49
∆Cash 1year 6,889    0.594 23.34 0.077 3.68 0.53 0.06 0.42
4years 3,540    0.327 6.12 0.176 8.20 0.32 0.06 0.25
*Debt Type Dummy
ln[(Equity/Asset)+1] ln[(Other Sources/A)+1]
Panel E: Seasoned Equity Offerings
Panel A: Straight vs. Convertible Debt Issues
Panel B: Long vs. Short Term Debt Issues
Panel C: Unsecured vs. Secured Debt Issues
Panel D: Non-Callable vs. Callable Debt Issues
Explanatory Variables
Dollar Changes ln[(Debt/Asset)+1] ln[(Debt/Asset)+1]
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l and for cash holdings is Y = 
] 1 ) ln[( 0 0 + − A V Vt
Dependent Variable:
 ln[((Vt-V0)/Asset)+1] t=1,4 N R-Squared
 ln[(∑Vt/Asset)+1]
Coef t stat Coef t stat Straight Convertible
∑CAPEX 1year   
4years   
∑R & D 1year   
4years   
∆Cash 1year   
4years   
∑CAPEX 1year   
4years   
∑R & D 1year   
4years   
∆Cash 1year   
4years   
∑CAP 1year 2,680    0.117 3.69 0.000 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.24
4years 1,120    0.167 2.25 0.437 0.97 0.21 0.74 0.63
∑R & D 1year 2,712    0.018 3.71 -0.014 -2.43 0.02 0.00 0.06
4years 1,143    0.058 1.39 0.000 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.11
∆Cash 1year 2,348    0.287 4.78 -0.089 -1.63 0.25 0.17 0.25
4years 952       0.199 1.67 -0.312 -1.65 0.19 -0.11 0.28
Coef t stat Coef t stat Non-Callable Callable
∑CAPEX 1year 1,666    0.005 0.10 0.125 2.47 0.00 0.13 0.25
4years 764       0.167 1.67 0.094 0.78 0.20 0.31 0.64
∑R & D 1year 1,688    -0.006 -2.80 0.007 2.63 -0.01 0.00 0.05
4years 781       -0.012 -1.05 0.003 0.25 -0.01 -0.01 0.13
∆Cash 1year 1,421    0.186 2.95 0.010 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.24
4years 631       -0.025 -0.40 0.198 1.22 -0.02 0.16 0.30
Explanatory Variables
Dollar Changes ln[(Debt/Asset)+1] ln[(Debt/Asset)+1]
Panel C: Unsecured vs. Secured Debt Issues
Panel D: Non-Callable vs. Callable Debt Issues
*Debt Type Dummy
Panel A: Straight vs. Convertible Debt Issues
Panel B: Long vs. Short Term Debt Issues
.  Independent variables are new debt raised, other sources of funds - both of which are 
normalized by total assets and interacted with debt type dummy – ln[total assets], and numerical scores for credit 
ratings (0 to 21).  All regressions include year and firm fixed effects.  Dollar changes are the implied change in the 
dependent variable when each debt type is increased by one dollar. Debt type dummy reflects convertibles, short-
term, secure, and callable debt in panels A through D, respectively.  Bold letters indicate statistical significance at 
the 5% level, using robust standard errors. The sample period is from 1971 to 2004.  
2,680 0.113 3.04 0.008 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.24
1,120 0.237 2.97 -0.338 -2.81 0.30 -0.13 0.64
2,712 0.003 1.21 0.056 4.90 0.00 0.05 0.10
1,143 0.012 0.76 0.261 2.13 0.01 0.26 0.23
2,348 0.206 3.21 0.383 3.72 0.18 0.51 0.32
952     0.164 1.50 0.308 1.17 0.16 0.43 0.35
Coef t stat Coef t stat Long-Term Short-Term
2,678 0.121 3.72 -0.039 -1.16 0.12 0.08 0.24
1,120 0.177 2.37 -0.587 -1.35 0.22 -0.51 0.63
2,710 0.016 3.42 0.040 2.99 0.01 0.05 0.07
1,143 0.050 1.38 -0.385 -1.58 0.05 -0.33 0.16
2,346 0.275 4.64 0.116 1.18 0.24 0.34 0.26
952     0.182 1.59 -1.039 -2.40 0.18 -0.83 0.32
Coef t stat Coef t stat Unsecured Secured
 
 
EX   
Table X 
Summary of the Empirical Results and Implications for Theories on Debt Contract Design 




Characteristics Empirical Results Implications
Convertibles Firm/Issuer  level
Issuers are smaller, have lower leverage and fixed asset, 
higher market-to-book, higher return volatility
Consistent with 'back door' equity financing (Stein 92)
and 'matching' financing and investment options (Mayers 98)
(vs. Non-Convertibles) Macroeconomy level issued more during recessions Consistent with Korajczyk & Levy (03) and Lamont (95)
Project level used more for R&D and held as cash, less for CAPEX Consistent with Stein (92), Mayers (98)
Short -term Firm/Issuer level
Issuer are larger, have lower fixed asset, higher
market-to-book, and higher cash holdings
Consistent with liquidity risk (Diamond 91), avoiding underinvestment 
(Myers 77, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 80), and signaling (Flannery 86)
(vs. Long-term) Macroeconomy level issued more during recessions Consistent with Korajczyk & Levy (03) and Lamont(95)
Project level used more for R&D and held as cash, less for CAPEX Consistent with 'maturity matching' (Myers 77, Diamond 91, Hart and Moore 94)
Secured Firm/Issuer level
Issuers are smaller, have higher leverage, lower market-to-
book, weaker cash flows, and poor past stock performance
Consistent with 'banking' view (Berger and Udell 90) 
Inconsistent with 'corporate finance' view (Stulz and Johnson 85, Smith and 
Warner 79, Berkovich and Kim 90)
(vs. Unsecured) Macroeconomy level - -
Project level less likely to be used for R&D Consistent with Mayers (1998)
Firm/Issuer level Issuers are younger, smaller, have less cash holdings
Consistent with interest rate risk hedging (Guntay, Prabhala, and Unal 02)
Inconsistent with mitigating agency costs (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 80)
Callable
(vs. Non-callable) Macroeconomy level
issued less during recessions
issued more when interest rate volatility is high -
Project level - -
Investment grade Firm/Issuer level
Issuers are largers, have lower leverage, higher 
market-to-book, lower stock return volatility, 
stronger cash flows, and lower cash holdings Consistent with financial constraints (Almeida, Campello, Weisbach 04, 07)
(vs. Speculative) Macroeconomy level
issued more during recession or periods of low 
economic growth Consistent with Korajczyk & Levy (03) and Lamont(95)
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Figure 1 
Time-Series Distribution of Debt Issues by Credit Rating 
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ln[Total Real Proceeds (constant 2000 $millions)]
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